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Abstract
High Frequency Trading and The New-Market Makers
This paper links the recent fragmentation in equity trading to high-frequency traders (HFTs). It shows how
the success of a new market, Chi-X, critically depended on the participation of a large HFT who acts as
a modern market-maker. The HFT, in turn, benefits from low fees in the entrant market, but also uses the
incumbent market Euronext to ooad nonzero positions. It trades, on average, 1397 times per stock per day
in Dutch index stocks. The gross profit per trade is e0.88 which is the result of a e1.55 profit on the spread
net of fees and a e0.68 ‘positioning’ loss. This loss decomposes into a e0.45 profit on positions of less
than five seconds, but a loss of e1.13 on longer duration positions. The realized maximum capital commit-
ted due to margin requirements ise2.052 million per stock which implies an annualized Sharpe ratio of 9.35.
(for internet appendix click http://dl.dropbox.com/u/1468608/hftatnmm ia.pdf)
Technology has pushed securities trading into a new era where automated markets compete for order flow
and high-frequency traders (HFTs) have become the most active participants. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) recently published a policy document that refers to HFT as “one of the most significant
market structure developments in recent years. . . it typically is used to refer to professional traders acting in
a proprietary capacity that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily basis (SEC
(2010, p.45)).” The document further notes that U.S. equity volume has become “dispersed among many
automated trading centers that compete for order flow in the same stocks (p.4).” It illustrates the NYSE as
an example as it traded 79.1% of its listed stocks in 2005 and only 25.1% in 2009.1
This paper links these two trends, HFT and increased fragmentation, through an analysis of Chi-X, a mar-
ket that entered European equity trading in April 2007. It started trading Dutch and German equities and
gradually added other countries’ stocks to grow to a 15.7% volume share in 2010, behind the London Stock
Exchange (21.3%) but ahead of NYSE-Euronext (15.6%) and Deutsche Boerse (12.6%) (see Federation of
European Securities Exchanges, FESE (2010)). Chi-X uses the same system architecture as NASDAQ’s
main electronic market, Island.
The paper’s main contribution is to show how one particular type of HFT, modern market making, appears
to be a necessary condition for the success of a new venue and vice versa. An analysis of Dutch index stocks
shows that Chi-X only generated 1-2% of all trades initially, but it jumped to a double-digit share in about
a month’s time after the entry of a new trader ID in both Chi-X and Euronext (see Figure 2). Moreover,
the participation rate of this trader closely mirrors Chi-X market share, both in magnitude and through
time. Also, the trader’s arrival coincides with a 20-30% drop in the bid-ask spread which is measured as
a generalized inside spread that controls for less depth on entrant market quotes (a precise definition is in
1The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) published a similar discussion document where HFT is a focus
area; it solicits research as the HFT chapter’s title is: “The impact of High Frequency Trading (HFT) on market structure is still not
fully understood (CESR (2010, p.31)).”
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the figure’s caption). This trader is the focus of this study and will be referred to as HFT as it fits the HFT
definition: it only engages in proprietary trading, it generates many trades (it is in 7.2% of all trades split
almost evenly across both markets), and it starts and ends most trading days with a zero net position. I
further note that this trader ID does not seem to be a strictly local player. In my 2007-2008 sample period, it
participates in 47.7% of all Chi-X trades (43.7 out of 99.2 million trades). If restricted to Dutch stocks only,
it participates in 56.7% of all Chi-X trades (4.9 out of 8.6 million trades).
A detailed analysis of the identified high-frequency trader shows that it acts as a modern multi-venue market
maker. The operation uses capital to produce liquidity. The production side is analyzed by a standard
decomposition of trade revenue into a bid-ask spread earned (or paid if the order consumed liquidity) and
a ‘positioning’ revenue based on midquote changes in the life of the nonzero position. The variable costs
due to exchange and clearing fees are then subtracted to arrive at a ‘gross profit’; that is, the profit does
not account for the (unknown) fixed costs of, for example, development of the algorithm, acquisition of
hardware, exchange and clearing house membership fees. The ‘capital-intensity’ is explored by calculating
the capital tied up in the operation through margin calls in both markets’ clearing houses. The HFT cannot
net positions across these clearing houses which is shown to increase capital requirements by a factor of
100.2 Combining the daily gross profits with the maximum capital draw-down yields an annualized (gross)
Sharpe-ratio of 9.35. Finally, the HFT characterization as a modern market maker is detectable in the overall
price process as midquotes are pressured downwards if the HFT is on a long position, upwards if it is on a
short position.
It is important to view the surprisingly strong results — high HFT profitability and the correlation between
HFT position and price pressure — in the context of new market entry. A natural way to interpret the
2See Due and Zhu (2011) for an analysis of netting eciency and counterparty risk for single vs. multiple central clearing
counterparties (CCPs).
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results is that the documented profitability is a return for entrepreneurial risk. If there is a large fixed cost of
building the technology to connect to both the incumbent and an entrant market and to design the optimal
algorithm to run the operation, then one should expect temporary ‘excess returns’ to make it a positive net
present value (NPV) project. In addition, there was considerable risk as, at the time, it was not at all clear
that Chi-X would be a successful entry given that at least one earlier initiative had failed, i.e., the London
Stock Exchange introduced EuroSETS to compete with the NYSE-Euronext system in 2004 (see Foucault
and Menkveld (2008)). If the HFT cannot fully diversify such risk, it leads to an additional required return.
The market entry context also explaines the HFT’s large presence in the market (7.2% of all trades) and its
position’s eect on prices. Subsequent entry of other HFT firms should dilute the identified HFT’s relative
weight and bring its rents down to a competitive level. The sample is too short to identify any such eect.
The paper’s focus is on one type of HFT that can be characterized as a modern market maker. It is part of
a rapidly growing literature that encompasses various types of HFT. Brogaard (2010) studies trading of 26
NASDAQ-labeled HFT firms in the NASDAQ market in 2008-2010. In the aggregate, he concludes that
HFT tends to improve market quality. Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2010) study the behavior of
high-frequency traders in the E-mini S&P 500 stock index futures on May 6, the day of the flash crash.
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010) model HFT as middlemen in limit order markets and study their eect
on trader welfare. The main idea is that, other than human intermediaries, machines have the ability to
process vast amounts of (public) information almost instantaneously. This paper’s main contribution to the
literature is its focus on cross-market activity, market structure development, and its detailed analysis of
the operation’s production capital, i.e., the capital tied up through margin requirements. This latter part is
particulary important in view of the literature on the link between funding and market liquidity (see, e.g.,
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)).
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The paper also fits into a broader literature on algorithmic or automated trading. Foucault and Menkveld
(2008) study smart routers that investors use to benefit from liquidity supply in multiple markets. Hen-
dershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) show that algorithmic trading (AT) causally improves liquidity and
makes quotes more informative. Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2009) relate AT to volatil-
ity and find little relation. Hendershott and Riordan (2009) find that both AT demanding liquidity and AT
supplying liquidity makes prices more ecient. Hasbrouck and Saar (2010) study low-latency trading or
“market activity in the millisecond environment” in NASDAQ’s electronic limit order book ‘Single Book’
in 2007 and 2008 and find that increased low-latency trading is associated with improved market quality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the institutional background and
presents the data. Section 2 discusses the methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4
presents the conclusions.
1 Institutional background
The classic market-making literature views the bid-ask spread, a substantial part of investors’ transaction
cost, as a compensation for the cost a market maker incurs. It is comprised of essentially three components:
(i) order-handling cost (e.g., the fee an exchange charges to process an order), (ii) the cost of being adversely
selected on a bid or ask quote, and (iii) the premium risk-averse market makers require for price risk on
nonzero positions (see, e.g., Madhavan (2000) for a literature review). Market makers prefer to operate
in a system where these costs are low (e.g., low fees or fast access, see discussion below). In human-
intermediated markets, however, it is hard for new venues to compete as the high search cost for humans
creates a participation externality: traders prefer to be where the other traders are (see Pagano (1989)). A
trader risks missing a trade opportunity when checking o-exchange prices (by phone, for example).
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Technology has dramatically changed the nature of competition among venues. Participation externalities
are severely reduced when markets change from humans on floors to machines on electronic markets where
search costs are significantly reduced.3 This creates more scope for new markets to compete through, for
example, lower fees that reduce the order-processing costs. But they can also be competitive on the other two
cost components of market-making. A fast matching engine enables a market-making strategy to quickly
update quotes on the arrival of public information and thus reduce the risk of being adversely selected. And,
a fast response time (referred to as ‘low latency’) makes the venue available to a market-making machine
that wants to ‘quickly poll’ for investor interest when trying to ooad a costly nonzero inventory position.
The increased ability of venues to compete could explain the proliferation of venues both in the U.S. and in
Europe. To the extent that such competition reduces the bid-ask spread and therefore transaction cost, this
creates value for investors. In addition, new venues might tailor to the needs of dierent types of investors
and produce additional investor utility this way (see, e.g., Stoll (2001)). Such venue heterogeneity however
is beyond the scope of this study; the focus is on competition between largely similar systems and the role
of a market-making HFT in the viability of new systems. I turn to Europe to analyze the successful entry of
a new venue: Chi-X.
Start of Chi-X. The European Union aimed to create a level playing field in investment services when
it introduced the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID) on November 1, 2007. In eect, it
enabled the various national exchanges to compete and encouraged new markets to enter.
Instinet pre-empted MIFID when it launched Chi-X on April 16, 2007. Chi-X operates a trading platform
which initially only traded Dutch and German index stocks.4 By the end of the year, it allowed a consortium
3The search cost has not disappeared entirely; Hasbrouck and Saar (2010) compare the 2-3 milliseconds it takes for participants
to respond within a market to the distance between New York and Chicago (both important market centers) which is about 8
milliseconds at the speed of light.
4“Chi-X Successfully Begins Full Equity Trading, Clearing and Settlement,” Chi-X press release, April 16, 2007.
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of the world’s largest brokers to participate in equity through minority stakes.5 Before Chi-X, Instinet had
operated ‘Island’ successfully in the U.S. which distinguished itself through subsidization of passive orders
(see fee discussion below) and system speed. It is claimed to be one of the fastest platforms in the industry
with a system response time, referred to as ‘latency’, of two milliseconds. At the time of its first anniversary
Chi-X claimed it was “up to 10 times faster than the fastest European primary exchange.”6
In its first 14 months, my sample period, Chi-X traded Belgian, British, Dutch, French, German, and Swiss
index stocks. It had captured 4.7% of all trades and was particularly successful in Dutch stocks with a
share of 13.6%. In terms of volume, Chi-X overall market share was 3.1% and its Dutch share was 8.4%.
Chi-X appears to have used the Dutch index stocks, my sample stocks, to launch what ultimately became a
pan-European operation.
Prior to Chi-X entry, Euronext was by far the main trading venue for Dutch stocks. It operated an electronic
matching engine similar to Chi-X and competition focused on fees and speed (see discussion below). Dutch
stocks also traded as ADRs in the U.S. and in the German Xetra system. They did not yet trade in NASDAQ
OMX, Turquoise, or BATS-Europe which entered later on a business model similar to Chi-X: low fees and
fast systems.
The broker identified as HFT in this study was a substantial participant in Chi-X. In my sample period, it
participated in 43.7 million out of 99.2 million Chi-X trades. It was particularly active in Dutch stocks with
participation in 4.9 million out of 8.6 million Chi-X trades.
Matching engine and exchange fee structure. The matching engines of Chi-X and Euronext both run
an electronic limit order book. Investors submit a limit order to the system which summarizes their trade
5These brokers were: BNP Paribas, Citadel, Citi, Credit Suisse, Fortis, Getco, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch,
Morgan Stanley, Optiver, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale and UBS (op. cit. footnote 6).
6“Chi-X Europe Celebrates First Anniversary,” Chi-X press release, April 7, 2008.
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interest. An example of a limit is a buy order for 2000 shares with a price ‘limit’ of e10. The order is (i)
either matched with a standing sell order with a limit price of (weakly) less than e10 in which it executes
immediately at the limit sell price or (ii) it is added to the stack of limit buy orders on the buy side of the
book. If executed immediately, it is labeled an aggressive order that consumes liquidity. If not, it is a passive
order that supplies liquidity. Also, the matching of orders is such that standing orders are ranked by price-
time priority. In the example, the standing sell orders with the lowest price get executed first and, among
these, the ones that arrived earliest take priority. For a detailed description of generic limit-order markets I
refer to Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995).
The exchange fees dier significantly across markets both in structure and in level. Euronext charges a fixed
fee of e1.20 per trade which for an average size trade (e25,000) amounts to 0.48 basis point. Highly
active brokers benefit from volume discounts which can bring the fixed fee down to e0.60 per trade, which
is the fee used for the HFT in subsequent analyses. In addition, Euronext charges a variable fee of 0.05
basis point. The act of submitting an order or cancelling it is not charged (i.e., only executions get charged)
unless, on a daily basis, the cancellation-to-trade ratio exceeds 5. In this case, all orders above the threshold
get charged a e0.10 fee (0.04 basis point).
Chi-X conditions on the incoming order’s type when charging its fee in what is called a maker-taker model:
an aggressive order gets charged 0.30 basis point whereas a passive order receives a rebate of 0.20 basis
point in case it leads to an execution. The platform is therefore guaranteed a 0.10 basis point revenue per
transaction; the optimality of such fee structure is discussed in Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2010). Chi-X
does not charge for limit order submissions and cancellations.
Post-trade cost: clearing fee and margin requirement. A trade is not done once two limit orders
have been matched. The actual transfer of the security and the payment is eectuated three days after the
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transaction; the trade is cleared and settled. This process leads to two types of cost: clearing fees and margin
requirements. Chi-X and Euronext also compete at this end of the trading process as they use dierent
clearing houses: EMCF and LCH-Clearnet, respectively. EMCF started as a clearing house at the same time
Chi-X entered as a new trading venue: April 16, 2007.
The entry of EMCF triggered a clearing fee war with incumbent clearer LCH-Clearnet. EMCF started
by charging e0.30 per trade, 36% less than the LCH-Clearnet fee: e0.47 per trade. Note that these fee
levels are substantial as they compare to, for example, the per-trade fee of e1.20 charged by Euronext (see
discussion above). On October 1, 2007, six months after EMCF entry, LCH-Clearnet responded by reducing
its fee by 34% to e0.31 per trade. At the same time, EMCF reduced its fee to e0.28 per trade. Half a year
later, on April 1, 2008, EMCF reduced its fee by 32% to e0.19 per trade; at the same time, LCH-Clearnet
reduced its fee by 26% to e0.23. Overall, clearing fees were reduced by 50-60% in the first year after Chi-X
entry.
LCH-Clearnet and EMCF are both central counterparty (CCP) clearing houses. They become the counter-
party to every trade which removes the risk for each participant that the counterparty to a trade becomes
insolvent before the actual transfer is due three days after limit orders were matched. The clearing house it-
self absorbs such risk and manages it by requiring participants to keep margin accounts with the clearer. The
capital held in these accounts is confiscated should the participant become insolvent. The margin require-
ment is therefore linked to the value owed in as of yet uncleared transactions. LCH-Clearnet uses the SPAN
methodology developed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange which charges for ‘specific risk’ and ‘general
market risk’. At the start of the sample, LCH-Clearnet charged 4.8% on the overall net position (marked-to-
market) and 3.0% for each stock’s position. For example, suppose a broker’s yet-to-clear, marked-to-market
position is long e10 million in security XYZ and e20 million short in security ABC at a particular point in
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the day. In this case, its margin account needs to have at least e4:8%j10   20j + 3:0%(j10j + j   20j) = 1:38
million. On February 9, 2008, LCH-Clearnet increased the specific risk parameter to 6.3% and the general
market risk parameter to 4.85%. EMCF on the other hand uses a proprietary system that is opaque to its
clearing members. The empirical analysis therefore applies the SPAN methodology to also calculate the
margins requirement on the HFT EMCF positions assuming that the schedules are competitive.
2 Data, summary statistics, and approach
Data. The main sample consists of trade and quote data on Dutch index stocks for both Chi-X and
Euronext from January 1, 2007 through June 17, 2008. The quote data consist of the best bid and ask price
and the depth at these quotes. The trade data contain trade price, trade size, and an anonymized broker ID
for both sides of the transaction. The broker ID anonymization was done for each market separately and
broker IDs can therefore not be matched across markets — say the first market uses 1,2,3 and the second
one uses A,B,C. The Euronext sample also contains a flag that indicates whether the broker’s transaction
was proprietary (own-account) or agency (for-client). The time stamp is to the second in Euronext and to
the millisecond in Chi-X. In the analysis, Chi-X data is aggregated to the second in order to create a fair
comparison across markets. A similar sample for Belgian stocks, except for trader ID information, is used
for benchmark purposes. The list of all stocks that are analyzed in this study is included as an appendix. It
contains security name, ISIN code, and weight in the local index.
[Figure 1 here]
Summary statistics. Systematically matching broker IDs across markets leads to one combination that
has all the characteristics of a high-frequency trader. Figure 1 plots its net position in ‘Unilever’ at various
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frequencies: minutes, hours, and days. The graphs lead to several observations. First, the series seems to
be stationary with mean zero. Second, it seems that the position is zero at the start and at the end of each
trading day. Third, the HFT appears to be highly active as positions change frequently and reach up to
e300,000 either long or short. These positions appear to last seconds, minutes, or even hours. The Euronext
data show that all of its trades were proprietary (the Chi-X data unfortunately do not flag trades as either
proprietary or agency). These characteristics match the SEC definition (see page 1) of HFT and this broker
ID combination will therefore be referred to as HFT in the remainder of the manuscript.
[insert Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 illustrates how Chi-X entry pushed bid-ask spreads down by 20-30%, but only after the HFT started
to participate in trading. The top graph shows that Chi-X captured a 1-2% share of all Dutch trades in the
first few months. It jumped to a double-digit share in August which is exactly the time that the HFT started to
participate in both Chi-X and Euronext trading. The bottom graph plots the evolution of the bid-ask spread
of Dutch stocks (index-weighted) benchmarked against the bid-ask spread of Belgian stocks.7 The latter
stocks serve as a useful control sample as they also trade in the Euronext system but get ‘treated’ with Chi-X
entry only one year later on April 28, 2008 (which motivates the end date of the graph). Taken together,
the plots illustrate that the HFT appears be the ‘new-market maker’. A detailed analysis of the change in
liquidity supply and trade characteristics is beyond the scope of this study, but is available in Jovanovic and
Menkveld (2010).
7The bid-ask spread is calculated as a generalized inside spread to control for less depth on the entrant market (Chi-X) quotes
as compared to the incumbent market (Euronext) quotes. It is defined to be equal to the bid-ask spread in Euronext except for when
the entrant market shows strictly better quotes. In that case the Euronext quote is adjusted to reflect the improvement: for example,
the inside ask is e29.99 if the Euronext ask is e100,000 at e30.00 and the entrant ask is e50,000 at e29.98 as e50,000 of the
‘Euronext depth’ would be optimally routed to Chi-X. Note that this is a traditional spread measure, i.e., gross of market or clearing
fees.
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As the HFT appears crucial to both Chi-X take-o and liquidity improvement, the remainder of the analysis
is focused on its activity. The analysis is based on its trading for 200 days starting on September 4, 2007
and ending on June 17, 2008. The sample of index stocks is cut into two equal-sized bins of small and
large stocks according to their weight in the local index. The remaining analyses are done stock by stock
and are summarized in tables that contain index-weighted averages across stocks. The tables also report
cross-sectional dispersion by reporting the range (i.e., the lowest and the highest value in a bin) in brackets
(cf. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993)).
[insert Table 1 here]
Panel A of Table 1 presents statistics to further support the claim that the trader ID combination is a high-
frequency trader. The HFT trades on average 1397 times per stock per day and is more active in large stocks
(1582 times per day) as compared to small stocks (315 times per day). It is a large market participant as this
activity represents a 7.2% participation rate in trades, 7.8% in large stocks and 3.5% in small stocks. The
average closing position is -29 shares with a cross-sectional range of -100 stocks to +68 stocks. This shows
that the HFT does not build up towards a long-term position but rather aims at mean-reverting its position
quickly. It seems particularly eager to avoid overnight positions as on 69.8% of all trading days it ends the
day flat. The average standard deviation of its closing position is 1120 stocks which is small judged against
how actively it trades. Interestingly, the HFT seems to be particularly eager to avoid overnight positions for
small stocks as it ends flat 91.0% of the days with an end-of-day position standard deviation of only 120
shares.
Panel B presents some more general trading statistics on the Dutch index stocks to show that these are highly
liquid securities. The average stock in the sample trades 15,800 times a day in the incumbent market and
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2,200 times a day in the entrant market. Average trade size ise29,000 in the incumbent market ande15,500
in the entrant market. Half the bid-ask spread is, on average, e0.008 which is 1.7 basis points.
Approach. The paper’s main objective is to fully understand the HFT strategy that led to the success of
Chi-X and to the lower bid-ask spreads. It takes a micro-economics perspective by separately analyzing the
revenue or gross profit8 generated by the HFT operation and the capital that is required for it. The profit and
capital are then combined to arrive at a standard profitability measure: the (gross) Sharpe ratio.
Inspired by Sofianos (1995), the high-frequency trader’s revenue is decomposed into a spread component
and a positioning component. Let nat cumulate HFT aggressive trades (in shares) through time t and let n
p
t
cumulate its passive trades. If started o on a zero position, this implies that the HFT net position at time t
is nt B nat + n
p
t .
HFT average trading profit over T time units is simply the average net cash flow (assuming it starts and ends
at a zero position9):
 =
1
T
TX
t=1
 ntPt (1)
where  is the average gross profit per time unit (not accounting for trading fees), nt is the (end-of-time-unit)
net inventory position, Pt is the transaction price. Rewriting this sum allows for a natural decomposition of
its trading profit into a spread and a ‘positioning’ profit:
 =
1
T
TX
t=1
nt 1pt   jnat jptst + jnpt jptst (2)
8This revenue or gross profit does not account for the (unknown) fixed costs of, for example, development of the algorithm,
acquisition of hardware, exchange and clearing house membership fees.
9In the data, the HFT closes a day with a zero net position 69.8% of the time (see Table 1). For the days that it does not, it is
standard practice to mark-to-market its position at the start and at the end of a trading day. This introduces an additional term in the
equation: (nT pT   n0p0) where pt denotes the midquote price. These terms are added in the empirical analysis, but omitted in the
main text for expositional reasons.
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where pt is the midquote price (the average of the bid and the ask quote) and st is the relative eective
half-spread (i.e., jPt   ptj=pt).10 In words, equation (2) reads:
profit = realized positioning profit - paid spread aggressive orders + earned spread passive orders
[insert Figure 3 here]
The HFT revenue decomposition is particularly useful to distinguish two contrasting common views on
HFT: a friendly view that considers HFT as the new market makers and a hostile view that claims HFT is
aggressively picking o other investors’ quotes. These views are illustrated in Figure 3. The top graph plots
the simplest inventory cycle for which the HFT generates a profit: it buys one share at a particular price
and sells it some time later for a strictly higher price. The subsequent two graphs illustrate two ways (the
extremes) by which the HFT might have generated this profit (by providing context to the prices drawn in
the top graph). In the middle graph it aggressively picked o on an ask quote that had become stale after the
fundamental value jumped. It unloads the position by hitting the bid quote after the bid and ask quotes fully
reflect the new fundamental value. The HFT aggressively picked o quotes; it paid the half-spread twice,
but made up for it through a (speculative) positioning profit. The situation in the bottom graph is quite the
opposite. The HFT buys the security when an incoming limit sell is matched with the standing HFT bid
quote. The fundamental value drops at the time of the incoming order which indicates that the sale might
have been information-motivated. The HFT ooads the position when an incoming buy order hits its ask
quote. The HFT acts as a market maker; it earned the half-spread twice but suered a positioning loss as the
first incoming market order was information-motivated. The graphs are the simplest way to illustrate how
10These equations hold under the assumption that the HFT engages in either one aggressive trade or one passive trade at each
instant of time (each second in my data sample) which is, most likely, not true in the real world. The equation is trivially extended
to deal with multiple trades per time unit at the cost of a more burdensome notation.
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both positioning and order types can be a source of profit or loss to an HFT; they should not be read as a
loss on positioning necessarily coincides with a profit on spread or vice versa. The actual decomposition
will reveal how important each component is in the overall HFT profit.
In the analysis, the exchange and clearing fees are subtracted from the spread to arrive at a so-called ‘net
spread’ paid or earned:
 =
1
T
TX
t=1
nt 1pt   jnat jpt(st + a) + jnpt jpt(st   p) (3)
where  is the gross profit per time unit (after accounting for trading fees), a denotes the sum of the (pro-
portional) exchange fee and the clearing fee that need to be paid for an aggresive order, p is the equivalent
of a for a passive order.
The first term captures HFT ‘positioning’ profit. It cumulates value changes associated with its net position.
If it engages in speculative trading this is expected to be positive; on average, it will trade into a long position
when the fundamental value is below the midquote and vice versa. The positioning profit might equally be
negative if it is adversely selected on its quotes (see, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Or, a negative
positioning profit might be willingly incurred to mean-revert out of a non-zero position (see, e.g., Ho and
Stoll (1981)). Hendershott and Menkveld (2010) show that in an ongoing market a risk-averse intermediary
trades o staying one more time unit on a nonzero position and suer the price risk versus subsidizing
trac to get out of the nonzero position. In the process it collects the spread but (willingly) suers a loss on
positions (due to the subsidy it hands out when skewing quotes).
The last two terms in profit equation (3) sum up her result on the ‘net spread’. An aggressive, liquidity-
demanding order leads to a negative contribution whereas a passive, liquidity-supplying order might lead
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to a profit. Aggressive trades pay the eective spread, i.e., the distance between the transaction price and
the midquote, pay the clearing fee, and pay the aggressive exchange fee. Passive trades on the other hand
earn the eective spread, pay the clearing fee, and either pay an exchange fee (Euronext) or collect a rebate
(Chi-X).
Long- vs. short-run positioning profits. To further understand HFT trading profit it would be useful to
decompose its positioning profit according to trading horizon. Does the high-frequency trader make money
on positions it turns around in a matter of seconds, but perhaps lose money on positions it gets stuck with
for hours? If so, how much does each trading horizon’s result contribute to overall positioning revenue?
Frequency domain analysis is the most natural way to create such decomposition. Hasbrouck and Sofianos
(1993) were the first to propose such decomposition of trading revenue and applied it to NYSE specialist
trading (see also, e.g., Hau (2001), Coughenour and Harris (2004)). The approach taken here diers slightly
in (i) that it is applied only to positioning profit (after stripping out ‘net spread revenues’) instead of the
full trading profit and (ii) it runs the analysis on the natural clock as opposed to the transaction clock. The
positioning profit is decomposed into bins of position durations with boundaries set at 5 seconds, 1 minute,
1 hour, and 1 day.
3 Empirical results
The results are presented in increasing level of detail. First, the HFT’s average gross profit, the capital
required, and the Sharpe ratio are presented. The gross profit is decomposed into its two main components:
positioning profit and net spread. Second, the positioning profit is decomposed according to trade horizon.
Third, the net spread result is analyzed by market and is split into its three components: the (gross) spread
earned, the exchange fee, and the clearing fee. Finally, the HFT net position data is entered into intraday
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and interday price changes to understand its impact on price volatility.
3.1 Gross profit versus capital employed
[insert Table 2 here]
Panel A of Table 2 shows that HFT gross profit per trade is e0.88 which is the result of a net spread of
e1.55 and a positioning loss of e0.68. It earns an average e1416 per stock per day. The positioning loss is
consistent across all stocks as the cross-sectional range is e-1.79 to e-0.07. It is robust evidence against the
hostile view of HFT that is based on speculation where the HFT creates an adverse-selection cost for other
market participants. In this case, the HFT appears to suer a consistent positioning loss. The net spread
result is consistently positive in the cross-section of stocks: it ranges from e0.25 to e2.15 per trade.
HFT large-stock trades are roughly five times more profitable than its small-stock trades: e0.99 per trade
vs. e0.19 per trade, respectively. This dierential appears to be entirely driven by a larger net spread earned
on large-stock trades as the positioning profit per trade is roughly equal across both size categories. Part of
the net spread dierential might be attributed to trade size as large stock trades are roughly twice the size of
small stock trades (see Table 1). It might also be explained by the larger relative tick size for large stocks
(e0:01=e22:97=4:35 basis point) as compared to small stocks (e0:01=e37:39=2:67 basis point) (see
Table 1).
Panel B of Table 2 presents statistics on the capital employed in the operation due to margin requirements.
On average the margin for specific risk is e272,000 which is an order of magnitude larger than the average
margin for general market risk: e84,000.11 These margins are five times larger for large stocks as compared
11The general market risk is calculated based on the HFT aggregate position (see Section 1). I choose to allocate it to individual
stocks according to their weight in the index.
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to small stocks due to the larger positions the HFT takes in these stocks. The sample period maximum
capital employed is a more relevant measure as it is (a lower bound on) the amount of capital the HFT firm
needs to make available for the operation. It is roughly five times as high as the average margin required
(e1,645,000 for specific market risk and e407,000 for general market risk) which is perhaps surprisingly
low given that this maximum is taken over every second in the 200 day sample period. This indicates that
the HFT is particularly skillful in keeping its position in check.
The general market risk reflects the extent to which the HFT takes on large positions (either long or short) in
the entire market which potentially constitutes a systemic risk. If its individual stock positions are perfectly
correlated across securities, the HFT takes disproportionate positions in the market. If, on the other hand,
they are perfectly negatively correlated, it is a market-neutral operation and less cause for concern. To
gauge the size of systemic risk, the actual general market risk (based on the size of the aggregate position)
is compared against a zero-correlation benchmark. The values are not very dierent, e84,000 vs. e75,000
respectively, which indicates that the HFT is not taking on disproportionate market positions. It also shows
that the HFT does not actively manage cross-security positions to remain market neutral.12 In fact, it seems
to be running the robots stock by stock.
[insert Figure 4 here]
The high-frequency trader has to keep margin in both clearing systems which is a source of a substantial
ineciency. Figure 4 illustrates the size of the ineciency by plotting its position in the ‘Unilever’ stock
in each market separately and aggregated across markets. The graph shows that the individual market
positions are larger in size and mean-revert more slowly than the overall net position. In fact, the process
for an individual market position will have an MA(3) character if it is not actively managed. The reason
12One reason it might not do so is that it could hedge its market exposure in the liquid index futures market.
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is that trades get settled (and thus disappear from a position) on the third day after a transaction. The
aggregate market position shown in the bottom graph (and in Figure 1) clearly is actively managed as mean-
reversion to zero is fast and positions are relatively small. Panel B of Table 2 presents the hypothetical margin
requirement if the HFT were allowed to net its position across the two clearing houses. The average capital
margin is approximately a factor 100 lower for both specific risk and general market risk; the maximum
margin is a factor 30-40 lower. Again, comparison with the zero-correlation benchmark shows that the HFT
does not take on disproportionate positions in the aggregate market.
Panel C of Table 2 presents Sharpe ratios based on HFT gross profit. The ratio needs the daily excess return
which is based on (i) the sample maximum capital employed which is an indication of the standby capital
required in the operation, (ii) the daily profit where a nonzero end-of-day position is marked-to-market
based on the latest midquote in the day, and (iii) the capital’s required return is set equal to the riskfree rate
which is downloaded from Kenneth French’ website (i.e., it is assumed that the HFT can fully diversify its
(entrepreneurial) risk). The average daily excess return is 5.86 basis points, its average standard deviation is
9.69 basis points, and the average annualized Sharpe ratio is 9.35.13 The Sharpe ratio is substantially higher
for large stocks as compared to small stocks: 10.77 vs. 1.02 respectively.
3.2 Gross profit: the positioning profit component
[insert Table 3 here]
13 The annualized Sharpe ratio is calculated as (
p
250 days  (rt) =(rt)) where (:) and (:) denote the mean and standard
deviation and rt B (t   r ft  max cap) where t is the daily gross profit as in equation (3) with start- and end-of-day positions
marked to market, r ft is the monthly riskfree rate, and max cap is the full-sample stock-specific maximum capital employed. In
the analysis capital is charged the riskfree rate. If, for sake of comparison, it is charged the riskfree rate plus a market risk premium
of 6% (eectively assuming a beta of one) the average Sharpe ratio drops to 5.88.
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Table 3 zooms in on the positioning loss reported in Table 2 by decomposing it according to trading hori-
zon. Panel A reports that the overall loss of e-0.68 is composed of a e0.45 profit on ultra-high frequency
positions which last less than five seconds, but losses on almost all lower frequency bins. The ultra-high
frequency profit is a robust result as the cross-sectional range, e0.15 to e0.59, is entirely in the positive
domain. The five seconds to a minute bin shows mixed results with negative and positive values for both
small and large stocks. The frequency bins with durations longer than a minute are virtually all negative as
ranges are consistently in the negative domain except for large stocks in the lowest duration bin where the
range is ( 0:13; 0:02).
Panel B shows that the largest loss of e0.67 for durations between one minute and an hour are due to these
cycles carrying most weight. As a matter of fact, 7.862/13.833=56.8% of the unconditional variance of HFT
net position falls into this duration bin. It also illustrates that the ultra-high frequency bin is disproportion-
ately profitable as only 0.3% of position variance is in this ultra-frequency duration bin.
3.3 Gross profit: the net spread component
[insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 disects the net spread profit to study its various components. Panel A presents the bottom-line
net spread earned (also reported in Table 2). This panel also shows that the HFT is equally active in both
markets: 50.8% of its trades are generated in Chi-X, the remaining 49.2% are generated in Euronext.
Panels A and B of Table 4 present a net spread decomposition for Euronext and Chi-X respectively. Compar-
ing across these two panels leads to a couple of observations. First, in both markets the vast majority of HFT
trades are passive: 78.1% in Euronext and 78.0% in Chi-X. The gross spread earned on these passive trades
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is of similar magnitude: e2.09 in Euronext and e2.52 in Chi-X. This translates into a substantially higher
net spread in Chi-X relative to Euronext primarily due to the strong fee dierential for passive orders: in
Chi-X these orders earn a rebate on execution whereas in Euronext they get charged; the average exchange
fee is e-0.31 in Chi-X and e0.68 in Euronext. This dierence of almost one euro is large relative to the
amount earned in the gross spread. Fees turn out to be of first-order importance for the profitability of the
HFT. The clearing fee is also substantially lower: e0.17 in Chi-X vs. e0.30 in Euronext. The result is that
the net spread result is substantially dierent across markets: e2.52 in Chi-X vs. e1.11 in Euronext.
In terms of aggressive orders, the most salient dierence across markets is that the Euronext gross spread is
e-1.26 whereas, surprisingly, the Chi-X gross spread is positive and large: e3.21. The unusual finding of a
positive spread for aggressive orders is an artefact of the accounting that takes the midquote in the incumbent
market as a reference price. This positive result therefore reveals that the average HFT aggressive order hits
a ‘stale’ Chi-X quote if the incumbent midquote has moved past it. For example, the HFT aggressively buys
and consumes a Chi-X ask quote of e30.00 if the Euronext midquote is e30.01 which generates a positive
gross spread result.
3.4 HFT net position, permanent price change, and price pressure
The results thus far suggest that the HFT is predominantly a market maker: on average, it earns the spread as
most of its trades are passive and it suers losses on its net positions. This section studies whether the HFT
position, given that it is a large intermediary (it participates in 7.2% of all trades, see Table 1), correlates
with price change. The microstructure literature suggests it might do so in essentially two ways (see, e.g.,
Madhavan (2000)): adverse selection and price pressure.
A market maker’s quote might be hit by an informed trader in which case the market maker loses money;
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the intermediary is adversely selected. This implies that the permanent price change (i.e., information)
is negatively correlated with the market maker’s position change. For example, an information-motivated
market sell order causes investors’ to rationally infer a negative permanent price change and at the same
time makes the market maker’s position increase.
The market maker’s position also correlates with transitory price changes as its solution to the inventory
position control problem is to skew quotes relative to fundamental value, i.e., apply price pressure. A risk-
averse market maker who is long relative to its optimal position adjusts its quotes downwards in order to
trade out of its position: a lowered ask increases the chance of someone buying and a lowered bid reduces
the chance of someone selling. In essence, it subsidizes trac in order to mean-revert its position where the
size of the subsidy is determined by trading o the size of the subsidy against the loss of absorbing price risk
on a nonoptimal position (see Hendershott and Menkveld (2010) for a closed-form solution to the stylized
control problem).
The interaction of the HFT net position, permanent price change, and price pressure is most naturally cap-
tured by estimating a state-space model as proposed in Hendershott and Menkveld (2010). The model
is implemented at an intraday frequency, yet recognizes a continuous round-the-clock price process (cf.
Menkveld, Koopman, and Lucas (2007)). The idea is simple. The unobserved ‘fundamental’ or ‘ecient’
price is characterized by a martingale:14
mt; = mt; 1 + n˜t; + t; (where n˜t; B nt;   Et; 1(nt;)) (4)
where (t; ) indexes time, t runs over days and  runs over intraday time points (9:00, 9:05, 9:10, . . . ),m is the
14The intercept is set to zero as the model samples at a five-minute frequency for one year of data. Merton (1980) shows that
estimators of second moments (variance, covariances) are helped by frequent sampling, not estimators of first moments (mean).
Hasbrouck (2007, p.27) illustrates the trade-o between estimator bias associated with setting the ‘high-frequency intercept’ to zero
against the estimator error of setting it equal to the sample mean. He considers it preferable to set it to zero for a one-year sample.
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ecient price, n is the HFT net position, n˜ is the residual of an AR(2) model applied to n (standard selection
criteria indicate that AR(2) is the appropriate model), and  is a normally distributed error term. The ecient
price equation uses the residual n˜ rather than n to ensure that m retains its martingale property. It also makes
economic sense as a Bayesian update is based on the ‘surprise’ change, leaving out the forecasted change.
The five-minute frequency is selected as most of the probability mass in the frequency domain analysis is on
minute cycles as opposed to second, hour, or daily cycles (see Panel B of Table 3). For ease of exposition,
let the time index (t; = 1) be equal to (t 1; max) where max is the latest time point in the day. The system
therefore runs around the clock and includes overnight price changes. The adverse selection argument
predicts that the parameter  is negative.
A transitory deviation from the ecient price, the unobserved ‘pricing error’ (cf. Hasbrouck (2007, p.70))
is modeled as:
st; = nt; + "t; (5)
where s is the (stationary) pricing error and " is a normally distributed error term that is independent of .
The n part of the pricing error reflects the price pressure exercised by the HFT to revert out of a nonzero
position; the argument predicts  to be negative.
Finally, the observed price is modeled as the sum of the ecient price and the pricing error:
pt; = mt; + st; (6)
The equations (4), (5), and (6) make up a standard state-space model that is estimated with maximum
likelihood using the Kalman filter (see Durbin and Koopman (2001)). The parameterization recognizes
potential time-of-day eects by making all parameters depend on  (including the error terms’ variance).
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To keep the estimation feasible, these parameters are pooled into four intraday time intervals: (open) 9:00-
12:00, 12:00-15:00, 15:00-17:30 (close), 17:30-9:00(+1).
[insert Table 5 here]
The estimation results in Table 5 largely support the market-making character of the HFT operation. Panel A
reveals that the size of HFT net position increases in the course of the day; its standard deviation is e57,500
in the morning, e71,300 by midday, and e84,400 in the afternoon. The first-order autoregressive coecient
reveals that roughly half of a shock to the HFT position disappears in five minutes which indicates that the
five-minute frequency seems appropriate. The AR(1) coecient is 0.48 in the morning, 0.51 by midday, and
0.40 in the afternoon. The quicker reversals in the afternoon are consistent with the HFT aim to end the day
‘flat’ (see Table 1); it is too costly to carry an overnight position with its associated price risk. The overnight
AR(1), the HFT opening position (after the opening auction) regressed on its position at the previous day
close, is 0.02 which is further evidence that the HFT manages its position within the day in such a way so
as to avoid a nonzero overnight position.
Panel B reveals that the HFT incurs adverse selection cost most of the day except for when it acquires a
position at the market open. The adverse selection parameter, , is consistently negative for all stocks in
the morning, midday, and afternoon (i.e., the range intervals are strictly in the negative domain). Its intraday
pattern is largely monotonic as  is -0.045, -0.031, and -0.026 basis points per e1000 (surprise) position
change, respectively. This might explain why the size of the HFT position gradually rises during the day (cf.
Panel A); the HFT increases its activity after the most intense price discovery in the opening hours is over.
The HFT is best equipped to intermediate at times when the market is back to ‘normal’ so that it can rely on
publicly available ‘hard’ information (e.g., quotes in same-industry stocks, index futures, FX, etc.) to refresh
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its quotes and thereby minimize adverse selection risk. This argument is developed in detail in Jovanovic and
Menkveld (2010). Interestingly, the adverse selection parameter  is positive for the overnight innovation:
0.027. The high-frequency trader seems to participate in the opening auction when there is an informational
opportunity. The size of this ‘favorable selection’ benefit, however, is small relative to the size of adverse
selection cost in the remainder of the trading day. This size is measured by the variance of adverse selection
(2
2
(n˜)) which is 0.3 squared basis points per hour for the close-to-open period vs. 37.6, 28.7, and 28.2
squared basis points for the morning, midday, and afternoon sessions, respectively. These sizes in turn are
small relative to the size of the permanent price changes in each of these periods: 701, 10,292, 6887, and
7635 squared basis points, respectively.
Panel C shows that the HFT net position generates (transitory) price pressure. The average estimate of the
conditional price pressure, , is negative for all time intervals: -0.057, -0.037, and -0.061 basis points per
e1000 position for the morning, midday, and afternoon, respectively. In a stylized market maker model, the
size of the conditional price pressure is the optimal control variable that trades o the cost of staying on the
position one more time unit (lower pressure) and a higher revenue loss to mean-revert a suboptimal position
more quickly (higher pressure) (see Hendershott and Menkveld (2010)). This insight could explain the
relatively high pressure in the morning as adverse selection cost is larger, the high pressure in the afternoon
as the risk of staying in a nonzero position overnight increases when the market close draws near, and the
low pressure in the midday as both these costs are lower. This negative  result appears robust for all time
intervals except for the afternoon session; the range of  estimates is strictly in the negative domain for the
morning and the midday, but not for the afternoon. The eect of price pressure is economically significant.
Its variance (2
2
(n)) is 6.5, 4.1, and 101.1 squared basis points for the morning, midday, and afternoon,
respectively. To put them into perspective, these numbers are larger than the squared average half spread
(1.72=2.89 squared basis points, see Table 1). Moreover, price pressure variance is more than half of total
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pricing error variance.
Taken together, these state space results indicate that the HFT does act as a modern market maker and its
positions explain most of the transitory pricing error in five-minute midquote returns. The HFT’s weight
in the market appears large or representative enough to generate visible overall price patterns. The HFT’s
large eect on pricing error is most likely due to it undercutting the best available rival quote on the side of
market that mean-reverts its position; if it is long it will undercut the lowest ask in the market by one tick to
increase the probability to get out of the positon. The HFT skews the midquote downwards this way. This
is, unfortunately, not testable with the data at hand as HFT quotes are not observed (only its trades). The
pricing error eect might, however, be entirely driven by its quotes on Chi-X where it receives a rebate if
executed. To judge the extent to which this is the case, state space estimation is repeated with the incumbent
market midquote as the observed price instead of the generalized inside market midquote used thus far.
The results, presented in the internet appendix, appear largely unaected. This demonstrates that the HFT
position eect on prices is not just a ‘Chi-X eect’. Finally, five-minute HFT position changes correlate
negatively with permanent price changes which is consistent with the positioning losses reported in Table 3;
the market maker is adversely selected on its quotes.
4 Conclusion
This paper benefits from proprietary Chi-X and Euronext datasets that contain anonymized broker IDs for
trades in Dutch index stocks for a sample period that runs from September 4, 2007 to June 17, 2008. One
particular set of broker IDs matched across markets shows the characteristics of an HFT that acts as a market
maker in both the entrant market (Chi-X) and the incumbent market (Euronext). In each market, four out
of five of its trades are passive, i.e., the HFT was the (liquidity-supplying) limit order in the book that got
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executed. It trades actively with an average of 1397 trades per stock per day. It makes money on the spread
but loses money on its positions. If this positioning loss is decomposed according to duration, one finds
that positions that last less than five seconds generate a profit whereas the ones that last longer generally
lose money. The HFT is equally active in both markets as roughly half of its trades are on Chi-X and the
other half are on Euronext. Overall, it is a significant market participant as it shows up in 7.2% of all trades
(aggregated across markets). It is particularly active in Chi-X where it participates in roughly every other
trade.
The paper goes on to calculate the capital required for the operation. It studies the two clearing houses
associated with each of the markets and retrieves their fee structure and margin requirements. The HFT
cannot net its positions across markets and therefore turns out to have to put up a 100 times more capital
than what would have been needed if netting were possible. This might in eect explain why the U.S. equity
market is most fragmented as netting is possible in the U.S. The maximum (across my sample period) of
the capital tied-up due to margining is then taken as a natural measure for the standby capital needed in the
operation. This capital measure along with the daily gross profits and the riskfree rate imply an average
annualized Sharpe ratio of 9.35.
Round-the-clock price changes are modeled to analyze whether the HFT is visible in the security’s market
prices. The market making literature suggests that it might be in two ways: permanent price changes should
correlate negatively with HFT position change (the HFT is adversely selected on its quotes) and transitory
pricing errors should correlate negatively with the HFT position (the HFT skews quotes to get out of its
position). The evidence is supportive. In the trading day, the HFT position generates significant (transitory)
price pressure. It is an economically meaningful amount as it is, for example, larger than half the average
bid-ask spread. Also, the (surprise) HFT position change correlates negatively with permanent price changes
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throughout the trading day, but not in the overnight period for which the sign is reversed.
Finally, the paper shows how fees are a substantial part of a high-frequency trader’s profit and loss account.
It is therefore not surprising that new, low-fee venues have entered the exchange market as they are attractive
to these ‘modern’ market makers. It is shown that such lower fees are, at least partially, passed on to end-
users through lower bid-ask spreads. This evidence adds to the regulatory debate on high-frequency traders
and highlights that a subset is closely linked to the rapidly evolving market structure that is characterized by
the entry of many new and successful trading venues.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics on trading in Dutch index stocks from September 4, 2007 through June
17, 2008. Panel A presents statistics on the high-frequency trader’s transactions; Panel B reports aggregate
trading statistics. For each stock size group, it reports the variable weighted average (where index weights
are used) and, in brackets, the cross-sectional range, i.e., the group’s minimum andmaximum value. Variable
units are reported in brackets.
variable large stocks small stocks all stocks
panel A: high-frequency trader statistics
fraction of days with zero closing inventory (%) 66:1
(50:5; 87:5)
91:0
(86:0; 97:0)
69:8
(50:5; 97:0)
daily closing inventory (100-share lots)  0:35
( 1:00; 0:68)
0:04
( 0:05; 0:17)
 0:29
( 1:00; 0:68)
st. dev. daily closing inventory (100-share lots) 12:9
(2:4; 38:4)
1:2
(0:8; 2:0)
11:2
(0:8; 38:4)
high-frequency trader #trades per day 1582
(344; 2458)
315
(93; 434)
1397
(93; 2458)
high-frequency trader trade participation rate (%) 7:8
(4:3; 9:5)
3:5
(1:0; 4:9)
7:2
(1:0; 9:5)
panel B: aggregate trading statistics
daily number of trades incumbent market, Euronext (1000) 17:0
(7:6; 23:4)
8:5
(5:3; 10:7)
15:8
(5:3; 23:4)
daily number of trades entrant market, Chi-X (1000) 2:5
(0:4; 3:9)
0:5
(0:2; 0:6)
2:2
(0:2; 3:9)
avg trade size incumbent market, Euronext (e1000) 31:4
(14:7; 41:7)
15:1
(10:6; 20:2)
29:0
(10:6; 41:7)
avg trade size entrant market, Chi-X (e1000) 16:8
(7:8; 21:9)
8:1
(6:7; 10:1)
15:5
(6:7; 21:9)
half spread (0.5*(ask-bid)) incumbent market, Euronext (e) 0:007
(0:006; 0:011)
0:016
(0:011; 0:025)
0:008
(0:006; 0:025)
relative half spread incumbent market, Euronext (basis points) 1:6
(1:3; 2:5)
2:2
(1:6; 3:6)
1:7
(1:3; 3:6)
avg transaction price (e) 22:97
(11:01; 27:24)
37:39
(19:41; 52:72)
25:08
(11:01; 52:72)
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Table 2: Gross profit, capital employed, and Sharpe ratio
This table reports statistics on the high-frequency trader’s gross profit (Panel A), the capital tied up in the
operation due to margin requirements (Panel B), and, using both the profit and the capital results along
with the riskfree rate, the implied Sharpe ratio (Panel C). For each stock size group, it reports the variable
weighted average (where index weights are used) and, in brackets, the cross-sectional range, i.e., the group’s
minimum and maximum value.
variable large stocks small stocks all stocks
panel A: gross profit
gross profit per day (e) 1649
( 50; 2751)
55
( 47; 125)
1416
( 50; 2751)
gross profit per trade (e) 0:99
( 0:15; 1:62)
0:19
( 0:18; 0:78)
0:88
( 0:18; 1:62)
positioning profit per trade (e)  0:69
( 0:90;  0:30)
 0:61
( 1:79;  0:07)
 0:68
( 1:79;  0:07)
net spread per trade (e) 1:68
(0:76; 2:15)
0:80
(0:25; 1:64)
1:55
(0:25; 2:15)
panel B: capital employed
actual capital employed
avg margin specific risk (e1000) 308
(62; 441)
62
(13; 83)
272
(13; 441)
avg margin gen market risk (e1000) 95
(18; 139)
18
(4; 25)
84
(4; 139)
avg margin gen market risk, zero corr benchmark (e1000) 85
(17; 122)
17
(4; 23)
75
(4; 122)
max margin specific risk (e1000) 1837
(485; 3206)
522
(90; 1000)
1645
(90; 3206)
max margin gen market risk (e1000) 461
(88; 674)
89
(21; 122)
407
(21; 674)
capital employed if netting across markets were allowed
avg margin specific risk (e1000) 3:04
(0:79; 3:87)
0:57
(0:20; 0:79)
2:68
(0:20; 3:87)
avg margin gen market risk (e1000) 0:99
(0:25; 1:28)
0:18
(0:07; 0:25)
0:87
(0:07; 1:28)
avg margin gen market risk, zero corr benchmark (e1000) 0:91
(0:24; 1:15)
0:17
(0:06; 0:24)
0:80
(0:06; 1:15)
max margin specific risk (e1000) 59:36
(16:14; 83:50)
15:15
(8:18; 19:89)
52:91
(8:18; 83:50)
max margin gen market risk (e1000) 25:62
(6:35; 33:03)
4:71
(1:69; 6:47)
22:57
(1:69; 33:03)
panel C: Sharpe ratio (based on maximum capital employed)
avg daily net return in excess of riskfree rate (bps) 6:80
( 1:31; 14:11)
0:32
( 2:03; 2:71)
5:86
( 2:03; 14:11)
st dev daily return (bps) 9:96
(6:60; 20:74)
8:14
(3:30; 22:15)
9:69
(3:30; 22:15)
annualized Sharpe ratio 10:77
( 3:14; 14:68)
1:02
( 3:06; 4:60)
9:35
( 3:14; 14:68)
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Table 3: Positioning profit decomposition
This table decomposes the high-frequency trader’s positioning profit (reported in Table 2) according to
position durations using frequency domain analysis (Panel A). It further decomposes (unconditional) net
position variance to establish how much ‘mass’ is in each duration bracket; this is naturally interpreted as a
histogram of durations (Panel B). For each stock size group, it reports the variable weighted average (where
index weights are used) and, in brackets, the cross-sectional range, i.e., the group’s minimum and maximum
value.
variable large stocks small stocks all stocks
panel A: positioning profit decomposition
ultra-high frequency, period5sec (e) 0:49
(0:21; 0:59)
0:24
(0:15; 0:39)
0:45
(0:15; 0:59)
high frequency, 5sec<period1min (e)  0:30
( 0:41; 0:04)
0:02
( 0:08; 0:20)
 0:25
( 0:41; 0:20)
medium frequency, 1min<period1hour (e)  0:67
( 0:99;  0:05)
 0:65
( 1:56;  0:17)
 0:67
( 1:56;  0:05)
low frequency, 1hour<period1day (e)  0:18
( 0:40;  0:06)
 0:15
( 0:43;  0:08)
 0:17
( 0:43;  0:06)
ultra-low frequency, 1day<period (e)  0:03
( 0:13; 0:02)
 0:07
( 0:17;  0:01)
 0:04
( 0:17; 0:02)
total positioning profit per trade (e)  0:69
( 0:90;  0:30)
 0:61
( 1:79;  0:07)
 0:68
( 1:79;  0:07)
panel B: net position variance decomposition
ultra-high frequency, period5sec (e) 0:042
(0:001; 0:060)
0:001
(0:000; 0:001)
0:036
(0:000; 0:060)
high frequency, 5sec<period1min (e) 0:539
(0:017; 0:761)
0:007
(0:001; 0:011)
0:461
(0:001; 0:761)
medium frequency, 1min<period1hour (e) 9:182
(0:362; 20:336)
0:145
(0:024; 0:307)
7:862
(0:024; 20:336)
low frequency, 1hour<period1day (e) 4:503
(0:247; 17:624)
0:085
(0:022; 0:271)
3:858
(0:022; 17:624)
ultra-low frequency, 1day<period (e) 1:885
(0:101; 7:284)
0:045
(0:008; 0:170)
1:616
(0:008; 7:284)
net position variance (mln shares) 16:150
(0:728; 45:866)
0:284
(0:059; 0:760)
13:833
(0:059; 45:866)
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Table 4: Net spread decomposition
This table decomposes the high-frequency trader’s net spread result (reported in Table 2) along three di-
mensions: (i) incumbent market (Euronext) or entrant market (Chi-X), (ii) passive or aggressive side of the
trade (the passive side of a trade is the standing limit order in the book that is executed against an incoming
(marketable) limit order; the latter order is the aggressive side), (iii) (gross) spread or fee. For each stock
size group, it reports the variable weighted average (where index weights are used) and, in brackets, the
cross-sectional range, i.e., the group’s minimum and maximum value.
variable large stocks small stocks all stocks
panel A: high-frequency trader in both markets
entrant market (Chi-X) trade share (%) 49:8
(43:7; 62:8)
56:5
(51:6; 63:6)
50:8
(43:7; 63:6)
net spread per trade (e) 1:68
(0:76; 2:15)
0:80
(0:25; 1:64)
1:55
(0:25; 2:15)
panel B: high-frequency trader in incumbent market (Euronext)
#trades per day 770
(216; 1189)
180
(48; 276)
684
(48; 1189)
fraction of passive trades (%) 79:5
(70:5; 82:5)
70:0
(58:7; 81:6)
78:1
(58:7; 82:5)
net spread per trade (e) 0:72
(0:09; 1:27)
 0:07
( 0:44; 1:01)
0:61
( 0:44; 1:27)
net spread per trade, passive orders (e) 1:26
(0:31; 2:03)
0:23
(0:05; 1:50)
1:11
(0:05; 2:03)
gross spread per trade, passive orders (e) 2:25
(1:25; 2:99)
1:17
(0:97; 2:44)
2:09
(0:97; 2:99)
exchange fee per trade, passive orders (e)  0:68
( 0:71;  0:65)
 0:64
( 0:66;  0:62)
 0:68
( 0:71;  0:62)
clearing fee per trade, passive orders (e)  0:30
( 0:32;  0:29)
 0:30
( 0:31;  0:29)
 0:30
( 0:32;  0:29)
net spread per trade, aggressive orders (e)  1:35
( 2:21;  0:80)
 0:75
( 1:12;  0:23)
 1:26
( 2:21;  0:23)
gross spread per trade, aggressive trades (e)  0:39
( 1:28; 0:17)
0:16
( 0:23; 0:66)
 0:31
( 1:28; 0:66)
exchange fee per trade, aggressive orders (e)  0:67
( 0:70;  0:63)
 0:63
( 0:64;  0:62)
 0:67
( 0:70;  0:62)
clearing fee per trade, aggressive orders (e)  0:29
( 0:30;  0:26)
 0:28
( 0:29;  0:27)
 0:29
( 0:30;  0:26)
panel C: high-frequency trader in entrant market (Chi-X)
#trades per day 812
(128; 1269)
135
(45; 183)
713
(45; 1269)
fraction of passive trades (%) 77:1
(71:4; 81:8)
83:3
(79:0; 90:7)
78:0
(71:4; 90:7)
net spread per trade (e) 2:63
(1:88; 3:17)
1:92
(1:46; 3:05)
2:52
(1:46; 3:17)
net spread per trade, passive orders (e) 2:63
(1:97; 3:15)
1:87
(1:46; 3:14)
2:52
(1:46; 3:15)
gross spread per trade, passive orders (e) 2:46
(1:97; 3:05)
1:90
(1:49; 3:17)
2:38
(1:49; 3:17)
exchange fee per trade, passive orders (e) 0:34
(0:18; 0:45)
0:16
(0:11; 0:21)
0:31
(0:11; 0:45)
clearing fee per trade, passive orders (e)  0:16
( 0:18;  0:14)
 0:19
( 0:22;  0:17)
 0:17
( 0:22;  0:14)
net spread per trade, aggressive orders (e) 2:61
(1:51; 3:36)
2:21
(1:43; 3:78)
2:55
(1:43; 3:78)
gross spread per trade, aggressive trades (e) 3:30
(1:91; 4:11)
2:65
(1:83; 4:18)
3:21
(1:83; 4:18)
exchange fee per trade, aggressive orders (e)  0:48
( 0:61;  0:18)
 0:22
( 0:28;  0:18)
 0:45
( 0:61;  0:18)
clearing fee per trade, aggressive orders (e)  0:21
( 0:22;  0:19)
 0:21
( 0:23;  0:20)
 0:21
( 0:23;  0:19)
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Table 5: HFT net position, permanent price change, and price pressure
This table relates inter- and intraday price changes to the HFT net position to analyze whether the HFT can
be characterized as a liquidity supplier. A state space model distinguishes transitory and permanent price
changes and relates each of them to the HFT net position consistent with the canonical microstructure model
of a supplier of liquidity (see Hendershott and Menkveld (2010)):
pt; = mt; + st;
mt; = mt; 1 + n˜t; + t; (where n˜t; B nt;   Et; 1(nt;))
st; = nt; + "t;
where t indexes days,  indexes intraday time points (9:00, 9:05, 9:10), . . . , p is the generalized inside
midquote (essentially the average of the markets’ highest bid and lowest ask quote, for details see footnote
7), m is a martingale that represents the unobserved ‘ecient’ price, n is the HFT net position, n˜ is the
(surprise) innovation in HFT net position where last period’s forecast is obtained based on an AR(2) model
for the net position series n, and s represents the unobserved stationary pricing error process. For ease of
exposition, let the time index (t;  =  1) be equal to (t 1; max) where max is the latest time point in the
day. The error terms  and " are assumed to be mutually independent normally distributed variables with a
variance that depends on time of day (). In the estimation all time-of-day dependent parameters are pooled
into four intraday time intervals: (open) 9:00-12:00, 12:00-15:00, 15:00-17:30 (close), 17:30-9:00(+1). For
each stock size group, the table reports the average parameter estimate and in brackets its cross-sectional
range, i.e., the group’s minimum and maximum value. Parameter units are in brackets.
variable time large stocks small stocks all stocks
panel A: net position
stdev net position, (n) (e1000) 9:00-12:00 64:6
(22:7; 80:3)
15:4
(7:2; 20:4)
57:5
(7:2; 80:3)
12:00-15:00 80:3
(25:1; 101:8)
19:0
(7:2; 25:5)
71:3
(7:2; 101:8)
15:00-17:30 95:4
(24:8; 128:9)
19:9
(7:3; 26:7)
84:4
(7:3; 128:9)
ar1 coecient net position, n 9:00-12:00 0:46
(0:38; 0:68)
0:56
(0:48; 0:73)
0:48
(0:38; 0:73)
12:00-15:00 0:50
(0:43; 0:69)
0:56
(0:48; 0:72)
0:51
(0:43; 0:72)
15:00-17:30 0:39
(0:30; 0:64)
0:43
(0:35; 0:62)
0:40
(0:30; 0:64)
17:30-9:00 (+1)a 0:02
( 0:01; 0:09)
0:04
( 0:03; 0:12)
0:02
( 0:03; 0:12)
panel B: permanent price change (m)
cond adverse selection,  (bp/e1000) 9:00-12:00  0:036
( 0:074;  0:023)
 0:098
( 0:425;  0:049)
 0:045
( 0:425;  0:023)
12:00-15:00  0:025
( 0:053;  0:011)
 0:067
( 0:211;  0:030)
 0:031
( 0:211;  0:011)
15:00-17:30  0:019
( 0:041;  0:011)
 0:070
( 0:272;  0:028)
 0:026
( 0:272;  0:011)
17:30-9:00 (+1) 0:014
( 0:380; 0:101)
0:103
( 0:441; 3:484)
0:027
( 0:441; 3:484)
var adv selection, 2(n˜) (bp2/hr) 9:00-12:00 41:8
(9:2; 59:6)
13:1
(3:1; 55:7)
37:6
(3:1; 59:6)
12:00-15:00 32:1
(2:7; 69:0)
8:8
(1:2; 22:0)
28:7
(1:2; 69:0)
15:00-17:30 30:8
(5:5; 69:3)
13:0
(2:5; 71:5)
28:2
(2:5; 71:5)
17:30-9:00 (+1) 0:3
(0:0; 0:7)
0:7
(0:0; 10:5)
0:3
(0:0; 10:5)
- continued on next page -
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- continued from previous page -
variable time large stocks small stocks all stocks
var perm price change, 2(m) (bp2/hr) 9:00-12:00 10863
(5386; 15723)
6954
(3701; 29159)
10292
(3701; 29159)
12:00-15:00 7400
(3199; 15933)
3888
(2545; 12407)
6887
(2545; 15933)
15:00-17:30 8009
(2925; 17473)
5448
(2804; 33593)
7635
(2804; 33593)
17:30-9:00 (+1) 690
(373; 1071)
762
(434; 3716)
701
(373; 3716)
panel C: price pressure (s)
cond price pressure,  (bp/e1000) 9:00-12:00  0:042
( 0:131;  0:017)
 0:146
( 0:539;  0:081)
 0:057
( 0:539;  0:017)
12:00-15:00  0:027
( 0:100;  0:007)
 0:099
( 0:428;  0:019)
 0:037
( 0:428;  0:007)
15:00-17:30  0:069
( 0:334; 0:115)
 0:014
( 0:758; 2:102)
 0:061
( 0:758; 2:102)
var price pressure, 2(n) (bp2) 9:00-12:00 6:8
(0:9; 12:3)
4:4
(1:6; 28:1)
6:5
(0:9; 28:1)
12:00-15:00 4:3
(0:5; 9:8)
2:8
(0:1; 16:9)
4:1
(0:1; 16:9)
15:00-17:30 104:2
(1:1; 517:2)
82:5
(0:0; 236:3)
101:1
(0:0; 517:2)
var pricing error, 2(s) (bp2) 9:00-12:00 10:3
(1:0; 27:8)
13:6
(2:5; 28:8)
10:7
(1:0; 28:8)
12:00-15:00 10:0
(1:9; 21:0)
16:1
(5:6; 54:5)
10:9
(1:9; 54:5)
15:00-17:30 117:9
(16:3; 536:5)
92:1
(0:3; 254:8)
114:2
(0:3; 536:5)
a: This AR coecient is based on the HFT opening position (just after the opening auction) relative to its
previous day closing position.
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Figure 1: Raw data plot high-frequency trader net position by frequency
This figure plots, for the median week in the sample, the high-frequency trader’s net position in ‘Unilever’,
the median stock in the large stock group. It plots the series for essentially three frequencies: minutes, hours,
and days.
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Figure 2: Market share Chi-X, high-frequency trader participation, and bid-ask spread
This figure plots three time series based on trading in Dutch index stocks from January 2, 2007, through
April 23, 2008. The top graph depicts the market share of the entrant market Chi-X based on the number
of trades; Chi-X started trading Dutch stocks on April 16, 2007. The graph also depicts the high-frequency
trader’s participation in trades, based on its trading in both the entrant (Chi-X) and in the incumbent market
(Euronext). The bottom graph plots the average bid-ask spread of Dutch stocks relative to the spread of
Belgian stocks. The incumbent market is the same for both sets of stocks (Euronext) but the Belgian stocks
get delayed ‘treatment with Chi-X’; they started trading in Chi-X one year later (April 24, 2008). The bid-
ask spread is calculated based on the best bid and ask quotes in the incumbent market but adjusts for entrant
market liquidity if the entrant features strictly better quotes. For example, the adjusted ask is e29.99 if
the incumbent ask is e30.00 with depth e100,000 and the entrant ask is e29.98 with depth e50,000. The
bid-ask spread is calculated daily as a cross-sectional weighted average where weights are equal to stock
weights in the local index.
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Figure 3: Trade revenue decomposition: spread vs. positioning revenue
This figure illustrates the decomposition of a high-frequency trader’s gross profit into a spread and a posi-
tioning profit by analyzing the two extremes of how an HFT might generate profit. One extreme is that the
HFT aggressively speculates; it consumes liquidity to pursue a fundamental value change that it observes
and trades on quickly: spread revenue is negative, positioning revenue is positive. The other extreme is
that the HFT passively makes a market; it produces liquidity by submitting bid and ask quotes and suers
a positioning loss when adversely selected by an incoming informed market order (see, e.g., Glosten and
Milgrom (1985)). An alternative well-understood source of negative positioning profit is a price concession
that a market maker willingly incurs to mean-revert its position (see, e.g., Ho and Stoll (1981)).
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Figure 4: Raw data plot of the high-frequency trader’s net position by market
This figure plots, for the median week in the sample, the high-frequency trader’s net position in ‘Unilever’,
the median stock in the large size group. It plots the series for Euronext only, Chi-X only, and its aggregated
position across markets.
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